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COSTING INFORMATION IN THE UK NHS: 
THE (NON-) USE OF COST INFORMATION 
IN THE UK NHS TRUST HOSPITALS 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims to examine empirically the development and usage of cost information in 
the UK National Health Services (NHS) in order to provide information on how it is 
currently used and how it might be used in the future. The issues of costing healthcare 
service have been discussed internationally, in the light of the Diagnostic Related Groups 
(DRGs). The findings suggests that, in the UK, despite the introduction of Health Resource 
Groups (HRGs), there is no indication that the Department of Health has any direct interest 
in pursuing the consideration of HRGs as a control device. Therefore, the micro effect is a 
decoupling from cost control at the organisational level. The paper adds to our 
understanding of the nature of the interaction between the macro steering process and the 
micro effects. The analysis of the data follows Habermas’ (1984) discursive process, which 
involves marshalling evidence, informed by a ‘middle range’ methodology (Laughlin, 1995, 
2004) to develop a convincing argument concerning a particular situation.   
 
 
Key works: DRGs, HRGs, cost information in hospitals.  
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COSTING INFORMATION IN THE UK NHS: 
THE (NON-) USE OF COST INFORMATION 
IN THE UK NHS TRUST HOSPITALS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The efficient use of resources in healthcare is important because inefficiency means wasting 
resources that could be available to provide care for those in need. The UK NHS legislation 
reinforces the view that this efficiency can be achieved by implementing cost/resource-
control mechanisms. This has previously been operationalised through the internal market 
and various changes to the health services administrative structures (Ham, 1999). The 
current UK NHS contracting process between providers and purchasers of healthcare adopts 
Health Resource Groups (HRGs), which are designed to group together episodes that are 
clinically coherent and consume similar amounts of resource. However, HRGs are not used 
as a means of distributing or controlling resources. In other nations, unlike the UK, the 
recourse to cost/resource control has been more explicit and it has been operationalised 
using systems of Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs)1. This study is concerned with an 
exploration of costing for control in the UK NHS in the light of the NHS model of control 
introduced by the New Labour Government (1997 White Paper). It aims to explore ways of 
improving systems of control and to provide information on how costing is currently used 
and how it might be used in the future within the UK NHS.  
 
The paper discusses the nature of the interaction between the macro steering process and the 
micro effects. It discusses the nature of the Government attempts to steer the NHS 
organisations. The paper examines empirically how cost information is developed and used 
in a particular NHS Trust, in the light of the organisational members’ perspective. It reveals 
that costing information is, at a certain extent, rejected. This study provides a unique 
emphasis on the impact of culture on the control systems in the NHS. The research approach 
adopted is ‘middle-range thinking’ (Laughlin, 1995, 2004), Laughlin’s (1991) and 
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Broadbent & Laughlin’s (1997) theoretical models for understanding organisational and 
accounting change. This theoretical combination is of an interpretative nature and, as such, it 
provides a language to discuss both the opportunity to build some understanding about the 
dynamics of the relationship between the societal level (the Department of Health) and the 
organisational level (the NHS organisations) and the issues of accounting change in 
organisations. 
 
The findings of the paper indicate that, although benchmarking in the UK NHS is not new 
(Jones, 2002), it has become compulsory, following the abolition of the quasi market (in 
which cost was perceived as necessary to price the outputs provided). The introduction of a 
system supported by benchmarking reinforced the need for a comprehensive and consistent 
policy to costing. The introduction of the Long-Term Service Agreements (LTSAs) 
initiative reflects the operationalisation of this approach (HSC 1998/198), as it implies that 
the budget allocations to the NHS Trusts should be linked to activities, according to a local 
health programmes (HImPs). It is within this context that all NHS acute Trusts should set 
their services agreement on a long-term basis. The most extensive changes have been 
developed within this perspective and, therefore, financial control of spending limits has 
become more visible through the introduction of the star-ratings system, which has financial 
control as one element (The NHS Performance Ratings for Acute Trusts, 2000/2001). 
Therefore, cost control remains a key element for consideration and this requires empirical 
examination.  
 
The paper is organised in the following fashion: Section 2 addresses the theoretical and 
methodological approach. It also provides a broad overview of the profile of the organisation 
that informs the basis of this case study. Section 3 develops a contextual understanding of 
the NHS current approach to resource control and, therefore, it briefly reviews the 
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approaches to costing/resource control and how these have been developed in the UK NHS. 
This section also provides a brief overview of the approaches to costing healthcare within 
the international context, in order to locate the UK. Section 4 focuses on the findings and the 
final section concludes the paper and provides directions for further research. 
 
METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
As this study illustrates a case of a macro steering (DoH) trying to regulate the systems (the 
NHS organisations) in the light of the lifeworld that informs the macro steering (DoH), it 
adopts Broadbent and Laughlin’s (1997) theoretical model. This model is built on the notion 
of control and design archetypes (Greenwood and Hidings, 1988)2 and, as such it provides a 
mode of theorising the control systems of an organisation, linking them to societal processes 
of control. This theoretical framework is complemented by Laughlin’s (1991) model of 
organisational change, which allows the application of the notion of ‘absorption’3 at the 
micro level.  Similar themes, concerns and conclusions are apparent in other studies, which 
address issues regarding the roles of accounting information in hospitals (e.g. Nyland and 
Pettersen, 2004; Lapsey, 2001; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1983). This paper confirms the 
findings of previous literature and it provides an indication of the nature of the decoupling 
from cost control perceived within the NHS organisations.  
 
This paper adopts a broad methodological perspective, which allows recognition of the 
importance of the context in which organisations operate and this is a relevant aspect in 
seeking to explore the issues concerning control processes in healthcare. ‘Middle-range 
thinking’ provides an analytical framework that can be used to build some understanding of 
the changing processes in organisations (Laughlin, 1995, 2004). It is within this perspective 
that this study undertook an empirical investigation into a particular NHS organisation and it 
adopted various methods of data collection. In line with the methodological approach, a 
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sample of medical personnel and management team were formally and informally 
interviewed. The analysis of both the DoH legislative documentation and the documentation 
of this particular NHS Trust formed the basis for the empirical investigation. The study 
extended to formal and informal meetings. The researcher’s attendance to the Trust’s public 
board meetings (1999-2002) became a rich source of information. Observation was an 
inherent and relevant part of the research process. The analysis of the empirical investigation 
is a result of the triangulation of all the data collection methods adopted in comparison with 
other issues that emerged in the informal and observational findings (Ryan et al., 2002). The 
analysis of the data follows Habermas’ (1984) discursive process, which involves 
marshalling evidence, informed by a ‘middle range’ theory to develop a convincing 
argument concerning a particular situation.   
 
The Organisation Profile 
The organisation, which is the focus of this study, is the largest non-teaching NHS acute 
Trust in the South of England. This factor was significant to justify the choice of this 
particular organisation. The NHS Trust under consideration is composed of two hospitals 
covering a population of approximately 450,000. It employs approximately 2,692 people, 
evenly situated between two sites located about 30 miles away from each other. Different 
physical aspects between the sites were observed and this seems to impact on the Trust’s 
management control issues. As an assurance of confidentiality was given, the hospitals are 
named 1 and 2. Hospital 1 is located in a large greenbelt and wealthy area. Its main entrance 
is peculiar, seeing as it reflects a shopping centre environment, which indicates some 
attempts to develop a patient-friendly environment as well as to generate extra revenue by 
renting out retail space. Hospital 1 houses all the Trust’s management. The Finance 
Department is located in a building, which was originally an old-fashioned Nightingale-style 
ward and, hence, at the edge of the hospital environment, with its main entrance 
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symbolically facing the resuscitation room. Whilst it is part of the organisation, it is placed 
on the fringes of the hospital. Although Hospital 1 is situated in a privileged area, there are 
issues concerning its location, which are critically interfering with both its quality of the 
service delivery and its general financial situation. Its location has impacted on nurses and 
carers’ recruitment and retention problems and this is perceived as a key issue. Many aspects 
are seen as causal factors that aggravate this problem, such as the high housing cost in the 
surroundings; the active private medicine; poor transportation links, the paucity of social 
activities and the pressure resulting from the increasing demand in A&E. 
 
Hospital 2, unlike Hospital 1, is run in a central small urban area, next to a busy road and 
surrounded by social facilities, where housing cost is not seen as a concern. Perversely, the 
staff employed by Hospital 2 are entitled to London weighting and, hence, their wages are 
higher than Hospital 1. As a result, Hospital 2 has lower staff recruitment and retention 
problems compared to Hospital 1. Ironically, the workload intensity in hospital 2 is 
considerably lower than hospital 1, because of the merger4. Therefore, Hospital 2 is not big 
enough to stand by itself and, although its staff turnover is not an issue, its small site leaves 
little possibility for expansion of activity. Consolidating activities to ensure that effective 
care is provided has been challenging for this particular NHS Trust. 
 
Financial Situation 
The local Health Authority (HA) reports that this NHS Trust presents, in absolute value, the 
greatest deficit within the region. While the HA considers that management control issues 
are key aspects of the Trust’s difficult financial situation, the HA’s managers were unable to 
provide any further details about it. The NHS Trust’s Financial Report on 31/01/03 presents 
a deficit of approximately £2,500.000 and this represented 3% of its annual budget. Its out 
turn for 2003 was a cumulative overspend resulting in a deficit of approximately £4,800,000 
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(Financial Report, 31st of March 2003). The main overspending directorates were those most 
directly affected by increased activity and recruitment and retention problems, such as 
Medicine, Accident & Emergency (A&E) and Anaesthetics. The highest expenditure in 
these areas relates to agency and bank staff5, which are necessary to minimise the 
recruitment and retention issue. The cost of hiring agency and bank staff is a key problem, 
since it costs 50% more than hiring staff employed by the Trust. The cost of constantly 
moving consultants between both locations, due to the split-site working, is considered high 
which has caused further problems for the Trust’s financial position. Its financial situation 
was further aggravated by the fact that the health economy entered into a period of 
significant change in 2001, which involved revision of both financial and functional aspects. 
The HA that contains this Trust was facing a substantial accumulated deficit in 2001. As a 
result, the need to generate significant additional savings had become a priority over the 
three-year period (from 2001 to 2003). As a result, this Trust had undertaken a savings 
programme to minimise the deficit faced by the region.  
 
A MACRO PERSPECTIVE 
New labour – inter-agency collaboration 
The literature has, for some time, been concerned with the UK State’s attempts to keep 
control of resources by introducing control mechanisms and accounting systems (Preston, 
1992; Purdy, 1995). Most authors have examined the Conservative Governments’ initiatives 
to ensure efficiency and provide mechanisms for pricing introduced in the NHS internal 
market (e.g. Le Grand, 1994; Ferlie, 1994). The issues of commissioning healthcare service 
within the quasi-market approach have been debated in previous literature (e.g. Barker et al., 
1997; Flynn & Williams, 1997). Some authors argue that, in the previous Government, 
costing for contracting purposes and the overall role of accounting became more 
sophisticated, taking an entrepreneurial approach (Lapsley and Pettigrew, 1994; Richardson 
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and Cullen, 2000). However, there is the argument that providers of healthcare used different 
costing approaches, which led to a paucity of comparability (Ellwood, 1996c). 
Notwithstanding the various attempts to develop costing, the literature argues that the 
Conservative Government’s policy of competition between providers and choice for patients 
did not deliver the efficiency and responsiveness expected (Propper and Bartlett, 1997). A 
range of elements was suggested as causal factors, including the need of a consistent 
approach to costing. 
 
In trying to attenuate the effects of competition resulted from the internal market, the Labour 
Government introduced the notion of ‘an integrated care model’ through the implementation 
of a new NHS model of control (1997 White Paper). This included the introduction of the 
Long-Term Service Agreements – LTSAs (HSC 1999/243), which were seen as a means of 
minimising the conflicts between providers and commissioners and tackle fragmentation at 
the local level (which seemed to be created by the internal market). The LTSAs initiative 
implies that the budgets allocated to the NHS Trusts should be linked to activities (HSC 
1998/198). Within this context, all NHS Trusts should set their Services Agreement on a 
long-term basis and according to the Health Improvement Programmes (HImPs). The 
Government’s expectation was that the LTSAs’ initiative replaced the short terminism of the 
market, in order to provide the stability needed to ensure appropriate access to high quality 
services across the country (equity). It is in this sense that long-term contracts (from 3-5 
years) replaced one-year contracts between providers and commissioners. In practice, the 
level of service activity and the financial investment (required from all NHS Trusts through 
LTSAs to achieve key targets) should be set in the annual Service Financial Framework 
(SaFFs). This process should provide the basis upon which the health needs (including 
aspects of equity and quality) could be reflected in the financial planning. This approach is 
similar to a previous initiative introduced by the Conservative Government, which aimed to 
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facilitate the contracting process by introducing the concept of a long-term relationship 
(Fattore, 1999). It was also a strategy to reduce costs; since the internal market was 
considered costly (Ham, 1999) and also because there is the assumption that long-term 
agreements diminish the frequency of negotiations of prices and products, allowing 
providers to manage their costs better (Jones, 1999, 2000).  
 
“A key issue in contracting for health service is how to ensure that providers deliver 
appropriate standards of treatment while keeping costs down” (Barker et al., 
1997:82).  
 
It was within this perspective that the NHS model of control introduced a new emphasis on 
standards and outcomes of services, along with a system supported by benchmarking, which 
reinforced the need for a dependable approach to costing. This approach was manifested in 
the mandatory requirements regarding the NHS cost-control guiding principle (HSC 
1999/098, page 18).  
 
This policy was operationalised through the National Reference Costing Exercise (NRCE, 
June 2000), which is part of an extensive set of performance measurements introduced by 
the Government (High Level of Performance Indicators, 1999) that compose the National 
Performance Framework (NPF). The NRCE’s main objective was to serve the NHS Trusts 
with the opportunity to recognise cost differences and understand the reasons behind 
variances ((HSC 1999/098)). The NRCE is composed of three main sets of information: The 
National Schedule of Reference Costs (NSRC), the National Reference Costs Index (NRCI) 
and the HRGs. The NSRC sets out mandatory requirements and guidance for the costing of 
acute services in order to compare costs and, consequently, allows the Government to tackle 
variances at the local level (First Class Service, 1999). According to the NSRC Guidance, to 
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which the NHS Trusts are subject, they are required to make costing information available to 
local commissioners and to the NHS Executive within a given timescale. The NSRC 
suggests that costing control should be undertaken in a collaborative way at the local level to 
facilitate meaningful discussions between providers and commissioners of healthcare on 
variations in the cost of service (HSC 1998/163 and HSC 1999/098). The NSRC and 
Activities Requirement provide detailed guidance on the national approach to costing and, 
hence, it details the range of services to be costed at HRGs, which are developed from 
national data.  The NRCI aims to rank hospitals according to their index value, to serve 
comparison purposes. This index is calculated by dividing a hospital actual total cost (HRG 
cost x number of HRGs) by its expected cost (national average cost x the number of HRGs).  
 
In seeking to provide a detailed framework to be followed by the NHS hospitals, the 
Department of Health launched the NHS Cost Manual (2000), whose aim (as its 
predecessor) is to introduce a more standardised approach to the treatment of cost and 
activity and to seek to improve comparability in cost information. Within this framework, 
Healthcare Frameworks are tools designed to compare aggregated data on people, patients, 
their treatment and its outcome. They plot groups of people with similar health conditions 
and expected outcomes given similar interventions (Health Benefit Groups-HBGs) against 
groups of interventions that are similar in resource use and clinical meaning (HRGs). HRGs 
are, thus, an attempt to get away from average speciality costs and move to a more sensitive 
measure by breaking down specialities into different groupings, according to the complexity 
of the procedure. In theory, the costing approach established through the NHS Costing 
Manual was introduced by the Department of Health to support the NSRC in an attempt to 
control costs in the NHS Hospitals. This policy follows a long tradition of central control 
towards the NHS organisations, which implies the possibility of controlling organisational 
behaviour through the establishment of national targets (Agrizzi, 2003). However, in 
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practice, the flexibility of the structure offered by the NHS costing approach and the inherent 
nature of cost apportionment, means that different NHS Trusts calculate their costs on 
different bases. The NHS Trusts make their own decisions about using different methods of 
apportioning costs, since the data are recorded in their systems in different ways6. In 
practice, therefore, the reference cost (and, then, HRGs) compares hospitals on different 
bases and this implies that HRGs produced by individual NHS Trusts cannot be directly 
comparable. The findings in this paper confirm previous literature that has shown evidence 
that the NSRC is not robust enough for comparisons and, as a result, cost variation between 
NHS Trusts cannot represent real efficiency differences (Llewellyn and Northcott, 2001; 
2003).  
World-Wide approaches to cost control 
Within the international context, hospitals have adopted different approaches in order to set 
their budget. In general, it has been a move from open-ended retrospective funding of 
hospital activities to the establishment of prospective budgets. One means of dealing with 
the issue of linking payment to activity is using DRGs combined with the Prospective 
Payment System (PPS) and this procedure has been used in the wide-world context to 
control the increasing public cost in healthcare. In the first instance, DRGs were created as a 
tool for better management in organisations, especially in hospitals, because it demands the 
involvement of clinicians in the accounting and cost process in the context of control 
(Lehtonen, 2000). However, there are issues concerned to DRGs’ functioning (see e.g. Fetter 
and Freeman, 1986 and Fetter, 1991). Most literature deals with the general related effects of 
the DRGs on hospitals (see e.g. Chua & Preston, 1994 and Charpentier & Samuelson, 1996). 
There have been many studies addressing issues regarding the implementation of DRGs in 
hospitals in particular countries, for example, in France, (Halgand, 2000), in Italy (Garattini 
et al., 1999) and in Norway (Pettersen, 2001). All these authors refer to DRG as a popular 
technique used in contracting processes in the worldwide perspective, despite the fact that 
 13  
there are issues concerning its implementation. Due to the considerable popularity of the 
DRGs and PPS internationally, it is interesting to note the lack of discussion of their use in 
the UK. The UK has not followed international trends, which is the adoption of the DRGs as 
a management and control mechanism in hospitals as well as to act as a pricing mechanism. 
The UK has introduced HRGs as control mechanism, but in a much less intrusive way than 
DRGs in other countries. In practice, the UK moved towards developing its own way of 
costing and budgeting healthcare. However, the question why the notion of costing activity 
by adopting HRG has not reached the local level is not only pertinent, but intriguing. In this 
sense, the NHS is still in the early stages of a long-term process of change. 
 
A MICRO PERSPECTIVE 
The Organisational Design Archetypes: 
In order to accomplish the demands of the NHS Cost Manual, this Trust implemented a 
costing information system, called ‘Plan B’ processed by PRECISION+, which is a 
Windows application. The allocation of its structure was developed under a top-down model 
and it illustrates how the elements defined by this organisation are linked to produce a unit 
price. The cost application shows that overhead costs were initially absorbed into patient 
treatment services support service and patient treatment service cost centres, in line with the 
NHS costing principles and concepts. Allocations based on activity data allow total absorbed 
cost to be grouped and allocated to speciality level. The allocated costs were distributed 
across the range of points of delivery within each speciality. From these points of delivery, 
the system produces a unit cost per speciality and patient type.  Alternatively, it can break 
down the cost further, using procedure level activity information and weighting factors, to 
produce procedure unit costs. If required, the system can also generate a unit cost per local 
group. For instance, overhead cost and support service costs can be allocated directly to 
patient treatment cost centres, according to the NHS Costing Manual. By grouping HRGs, 
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Precision+ produces sets of HRG reports, calculating and reconciling average costs of 
procedures by point of delivery across specialities. This NHS Trust defines 39 different 
groups of specialities. The criteria used to allocate indirect costs within this organisation 
depend on the availability of information. For example, there is a lack of data about the 
details of the hospitals activities; there is no record of how exactly clinicians spend their 
time seeing patients. The costing information related to clinical work is generally built from 
data informally gathered from medical personnel. There is a lack of basic information such 
as the area of the hospital building, which could be used to allocate overhead cost (e.g. 
heating costs). The casualness that cost information is dealt with confirms the debates that 
have been raised in the literature about the concerns of adopting reference costs for 
comparison.  Nonetheless, in official terms, the cost control demands are met in line with the 
DoH costs’ guidelines. However, in the context of perceived organisational requirements, 
the situation is different and it leads to the question of what the cost information is used for. 
 
The Organisational Interpretative Schemes 
Regardless of the fact that the official obligations are met, in practice, costing information 
produced by this organisation is, at its best, loosely coupled to organisational activities. It 
has only served the purpose of meeting the NRCE requirements and, hence, is not linked to 
the organisation’s management at any stage. The Finance Team’s main concern is with the 
global budget situation:  
 
“At the end of the day, mine is a job that sits outside everybody’s work. Everybody 
else’s work in the Trust is more concerned with the functional budget and, hence, 
how much money they have left for the current year... As far as I am concerned, 
nobody uses cost information for internal purposes…From an external point of 
view? Well, nobody has come back to me asking questions about the cost 
information that I have prepared and released … and this is the case of all other 
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NHS Trust…” (Finance Manager 1, in charge of the implementation of the costing 
system required to compose the NRCE). 
 
Despite the fact that the NHS Trusts’ income should be negotiated through Long-Term 
Service Agreement (LTSAs) including a linkage between activities and income (and then the 
use of HRGs), this policy was not yet entirely visible in practice within this Trust, where the 
annual SaFFs are still based on historical data. Thus, HRGs are not adopted in 
commissioning healthcare, although its adoption is explicitly set up in the legislation as a 
means of linking income to activity: 
  
 “Contracts are negotiated with the Health Authority in an annual cycle and an 
historical-based term. It has been like this for years”. (Financial Manager 1)  
 
Nonetheless, according to the Modernisation Fund initiative7, extra income can be allocated 
to HA to tackle local priorities and to complement the budget allocated to NHS Trusts. 
However, the fact that income is not linked to activities has aggravated this Trust’s financial 
debts, because there is an increase in the demand in general and, in particular, in the A&E 
Department (approximately 4% per year - the Activity & Finance Report, Dec-2001) (see 
also Jones and Dewing, 1997; Lapsley, 1997 and Model and Lee, 2001). This fact 
contradicts the Reference Costs approach, which is to facilitate and allow discussions 
between providers and commissioners on variations in the cost of service. Evidence shows 
that discussions within this Trusts and amongst HA and PCGs (Primary Care Groups) do not 
involve, at any stage, debates about Reference Cost or the use of HRGs in commissioning:  
 
 ‘Cost information is not used for any external or internal purpose at any stage 
within the Trust… not that I’m aware of. Issues of cost are not raised in our 
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meetings, but we are concerned about keeping control of resources all the time.’ 
(Finance Manager 2) (Emphasis added) 
 
Whilst reducing expenses was a concern constantly raised, issues related to cost-control 
or/and HRGs were never part of the agenda in the Trust’s board meetings attended by the 
researcher. The management concerns evolved around the demands of the key targets, 
established through the star-ratings systems and this included keeping the organisation 
within a balanced budget. Thus, cost-control issues were placed aside. Whilst the 
management team was mostly troubled with global budgeting issues, and they had focussed 
on means of diminishing the problems of resource-constraints, minimal attention was paid to 
the possibility of using costing information (or HRGs) to provide them with some 
understanding of the Trust’s difficult financial situation. Resource control was performed in 
a contradictory way, rather than based on any engagement with costing information. 
 
Contradictory ways to approach the issues of resource control 
The strategy adopted by this Trust to control expenses relates to the nature of the service that 
the Departments provided and on what was alleged to be an efficient way to reduce 
expenses. Within this Trust, it is at directorate level that the directors are responsible for 
their costs, and there are different dimensions of the problems in different organisational 
settings. In the A&E Department, for instance, the strategy to reduce expenses is to limit the 
use of the most expensive medicines. 
  
“We (Consultant Directors) say to them (Junior Doctors) that, unless there is a good 
reason to use the more expensive drugs, they should use the cheapest ones. But, 
now we have got a problem, because there is some evidence that some expensive 
drugs are slightly more efficient than the cheapest ones. Therefore, if a thirty-year 
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old patient comes with a heart attack diagnosis, the doctor tends to use the more 
expensive drug, because the cost benefit looks higher. On the other hand, a 55 
years-old patient will get the cheapest drug, because it is not very clear whether the 
result between the different types of drugs is very relevant”. (Emphasis added) 
(A&E Consultant 2)  
 
A&E relies on cutting cost by restricting the use of expensive medicine, because there is the 
assumption that saving could easily be achieved by controlling the consumption of 
expensive drugs. The A&E’s constant attempt to reduce the utilization of a particular 
expensive drug prescribed in heart-attack diagnosis (which unit cost is approximately £600 
to £800) is an example that illustrates this assumption. However, further investigation 
carried out on the A&E expenditures revealed that the highest expenditure in the A&E did 
not relate to the consumption of that particular expensive drug, but to penicillin and 
paracetamol. These are considered low-cost drugs, although they represented a significant 
portion of the total expenses because of its high level of consumption. The expenditure on 
costly drugs was, in fact, irrelevant (owing to its low level of consumption) compared to 
those low-priced drugs. Therefore, the effort to control the consumption of that particular 
expensive drug had no impact on the overall A&E spending. On the other hand, if the 
consumption of those particular inexpensive drugs could be diminished, there would be a 
positive impact on the A&E finance position. Nevertheless, achieving savings on these 
products does not seem to be attainable, given that high levels of consumption are necessary 
to minimise patients’ pain.  As it is apparent, achieving savings in A&E is a challenging 
task. 
 
On the other hand, Surgery and Medicine Departments’ strategy to control expenses 
included the closure of wards because it represented a save on staff costs. This approach 
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cannot be applied in the A&E, since it must be run within a minimum secure number of 
nurses (as it is not able to control the flow of incoming patients). Controlling expenditure by 
reducing nurse hours became a common feature within this NHS Trust, in attempt to 
minimise its financial difficulties. In the medical speciality, for example, while the national 
recommendation rate is to keep one nurse per bed per 24 hours (three shifts), the Trust’s rate 
during the course of this empirical investigation were 0.8 nurses per bed. This meant that, 
due to budget constraint, this Trust kept 20% fewer nurses in the ward than it should. 
Closing wards improved staff morale, since it diminished the pressure on them and it 
allowed the recruitment of nurses on other surgical wards. However, it meant that beds were 
lost permanently. As shortage of bed leads to cancellation8 of operations, an unavoidable 
negative effect on the waiting-list achievement took place. Two medical wards were closed 
during the course of this empirical investigation, in an endeavour to achieve savings of 
£350,000, as part of the Performance Improvement Plan set in the Southeast region. Yet, this 
Trust was not able to meet the financial targets established by the ratings-system.  
 
The examples above support the notion that using unit/activity cost information for control is 
not part of the organisation’s interpretative schemes, despite the pressure to control 
resources exerted by the macro steering media (DoH). Within this Trust, the management 
team assumes that cost control and budget issues is a finance team’s concern and that 
clinicians are not interested in engaging with this matter. This was the main reason given by 
finance managers to justify the lack of interaction between finance and medical personnel: 
 
“Doctors do not worry about cost issues. They are not interested in HRGs, but 
concerned about their own research… You know, it is not their business… I tried 
very hard to get some information to try to cost activities to compose the reference 
 19  
cost… going around here and there, talking to nurses…and could not get much.” 
(Finance Manager 1)  
 
On the other hand, clinicians state that they are interested in cost-control matters, but the 
Trust’s management team does not promote integration between medical personnel and 
finance to facilitate their engagement, at any level:  
 
“In general, finance people are sitting in there (in the Finance Department) 
producing figures instead of getting outside their office to talk to the people like me 
(Consultants) who have influence…It is quite comfortable to be seated out 
there…they have got to talk to us! It is dirty out here! I’m sure that there is a 
strategic plan out there, but on the ground, I have not seen any clear evidence of 
that to look forward.” (Consultant 1)  
 
Consultants’ perception is that the Trust’s management team is not interested in engaging 
doctors with the management decision in a more holistic way: 
 
 “There has been a lack of dialogue between us (Consultants) and the Management 
Team about having a discussion and debate about what goes on in financial terms. I 
mean: What are we doing? What are we spending our money on? Can we look at 
that? But, nothing happens! I have not had a conversation about cost control in any 
more detail in the last 5 years!”. All we hear is that we need to control the budget! 
(Consultant 3) (Emphasis added) 
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Budget Issues 
The Trust’s internal budgets are assigned by department (directorates) on an historical basis. 
The main historical estimations refer to staff wages and supplies.  As mentioned earlier, 
there is no routine adjustment for activity-level expected other than based on the historic 
information. The Accountant Directorates are in charge of budgetary control. This control 
process occurs by informing the budget holders, on a monthly basis, how much they have 
spent and how much they have left throughout the current year. Clinicians’ understanding is 
that they would rather deal with their own budget, if it was assigned to their own specialty, 
because they consider that they can manage it rather better.  
 
“We should have our own budget to spend the way we wish. It got to be better! If 
we had our own budget, we would look after it carefully. We (as everybody else) 
would try to manage our system better. Now it is lost! At the moment there is no 
incentive, no scheme to be followed. We, more or less, do what we want, really.” 
(Consultant 4)  
 
Within this Trust, financial elements override most aspects. The local Health Authority 
confirmed that extra income was being transferred to this NHS Trust, in the light of the 
Modernisation Fund’s scheme. However, the Trust’s Financial Team verified that this extra 
income was being used to ease the Trust’s financial deficit. On the other hand, Consultants 
expressed their disappointment with management team’s decision:   
 
“Some months ago (March-2002) we had extra money from the Health Authority to 
do more of a particular kind of operation9 in order to cut the waiting list down to 
three months. This money was allocated to our speciality. We thought that this was 
wonderful, because, as you know, there is a lot of this particular disease out there! 
 21  
But, the end of the year came and clearly part of this money was taken away and 
used for something else, which we had no information about it!!! (Consultant 3) 
 
Financial pressures within this NHS Trust mean that when the end of the financial year 
approaches, it becomes more challenging for the management team to keep within a 
balanced budget. As the financial burden increases, they pass their apprehension onto 
medical personnel who believe that, whilst they are prevented from engaging with the 
Trust’s decision throughout the year, they are approached by the Management Team only at 
the end of the financial year to be required to control resources. 
 
 "Finance people do not come to us to inform us of what is going on! But, by the end of 
the financial year they go: Stop this! stop that! because we have only one quarter of a 
million left… That is all that happens here!” (original emphasis) (Consultant 3) 
 
 “All the management team talks about is that the end of the year is coming and that 
the Trust is overspent and, then we must cut resources! That we need to save money 
or we cannot expand the service due to resource-constraints.” (Consultant 2) 
 
In contrast, the procedure to control the budget at other times along the year is simple to 
inform the budget holders their monthly expenditure.  
 
DISCUSSION 
This paper aims to develop an understanding of how cost information is developed and used 
as a control device in a particular NHS Trust in the light of the organisational members’ 
perspective. This study illustrates a case of a macro steering trying to regulate the systems 
(the NHS organisations) according to a perception of the lifeworld that informs the macro 
 22  
steering, which is assumed to be acceptable to the micro interpretative schemes (the NHS 
organisations). It is within this context that the issues are expressed here in two levels of 
concern: at the institutional steering-media level (macro effects) and at the systems level 
(micro effects):  
 
Macro Effects 
Despite the fact that the NHS legislation reinforces a comprehensive and consistent approach 
to cost control and this is expressed through the development of HRGs, there is no 
suggestion, in practice, that the DoH has any interest in considering HRGs as a control 
device. Two main aspects support this view: First, HRGs are only adopted to compose the 
Reference Costs (NSRC), which only serves the purpose of benchmarking. Second, although 
HRGs are embedded in the UK contracting process, they are still under developed compared 
with systems in other countries. In the UK, HRGs are used retrospectively, not proactively 
and prospectively. Unlike other nations, where the use of DRGs has provided an attempt to 
respond to resource allocation issues, in the UK, the debate is one of allocation of resources 
and not payment for activity. Noticeably, there are historic and contextual specificities in the 
different nations that lead to different approaches to funding healthcare. However, the lack 
of interest in the possibility of adopting any cost-control technique as a control device in the 
UK remains surprising.  
 
The UK follows its own approach. The current legislation directing the delivery of 
healthcare implies that it is expected that more activity can be undertaken with existing 
resources. This policy entails controlling resources by setting budget and performance 
targets (e.g. Star-Ratings System) while, in practice, cost-control is disregarded. This study 
confirms the view that the UK NHS reflects a culture that embeds the concept that the 
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linkage of costs to an individual’s health care is inappropriate (see also Broadbent et al., 
1991):  
 “The culture in this country is that we (clinicians) should be able to do everything 
without thinking about cost. Nobody wants to be controlled wherever they are any 
way. However, clinicians in the USA, for example, have only complied with DRGs 
because DRGs were imposed on them very strongly. Nevertheless, in the UK there 
is no such thing! If you go around and ask ‘What is the cost of opening a package of 
stitching material? Alternatively ‘What is the cost to put gauze on a wound?’ 
Clinicians go: - ‘What?’ They are not used to thinking about that.’ (Consultant 4) 
(Original emphasis) 
   
 “I suspect that I’m more cost-conscious than some doctors. Therefore, I introduced 
this glue10 early as a cost control measure. I think that this comes from my 
experience of working overseas, in a third world country, where there is very 
limited resource and huge demand for care. In addition, the patients pay for drugs 
themselves. Therefore, we have to be aware of cost all the time and, because we 
knew the cost involved. However, here…you know… the NHS cannot go bankrupt. 
So far! (Consultant 2) (Emphasis added) 
 
The comments below confirm the assumption that the lifeworld that informs the macro 
steering embraces the view that the linkage between cost control and healthcare should not 
be made and that this notion is transferred to the organisational context: 
 
Micro Effects 
Despite the fact that the Trust’s Finance Team has introduced a comprehensive and 
consistent approach to costing control (which adopts HRGs), according to the Department of 
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Health demands (NHS Costing Manual), a disengagement with cost-based information is 
reflected throughout the discourses of both the management team and medical personnel. 
The unwillingness of the organisational members to engage with financial matters is not a 
unique finding (see e.g. Knights and Collinson, 1987). However, the lack of interest in cost-
control issues within this organisation includes finance people and this is surprising, 
considering the financial difficulties that this NHS Trust was experiencing. The view that 
cost control in healthcare is not accepted is entrenched in the NHS origins and this view is 
believed to be shared by Consultants. Despite the fact that resource control was an issue 
raised in every single meeting attended by the researcher, there was no evidence showing 
that Financial Managers (FMs) had any interest in utilizing costing information to build an 
understanding of the nature of the Trust’s financial problems. They were consumed by the 
pressure to meet the demands of the key performance indicators, which included keeping a 
balanced budget. An interesting aspect observed was that FMs tried to cope with financial 
pressures without involving clinicians and without involving themselves in clinical work. It 
was apparent that FMs seek to ‘absorb’ the impact of the macro steering, which, given that 
this is not very intrusive in term of cost control, it is not as complex as it might be. However, 
as the financial year approaches and the financial balanced-budget pressure increases, FMs 
realise that ‘absorption’ is no longer possible. As the absorbing group, they realise that they 
are failing and, therefore, they tend to shift into a panic mode and start compelling clinicians 
to reduce expenses in a more anxious manner. On the other hand, the medical personnel 
show resentment, because they feel excluded from the Trust’s decision-making processes. 
FMs are seen as creating a set of ‘extra’ problems to clinicians and, as a result, an ‘overspill’ 
situation takes place within this organisation.  
 
The discussion of this case leads to raise several questions such as why do Finance 
Managers behave in that way? Are Clinicians actually disinterested in cost-control issues? 
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Why does not UK Government embrace HRGs (or any other cost technique) as a means of 
controlling resources? Why is there an emphasis on Performance Indicators instead? Three 
issues are pertinent to seeking answers to these questions: Firstly, the coupling of cost with 
activity is perceived within this Trust as ‘non-relevant’ law (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997). 
The fact that HRGs are not attached to operational activities at any stage within this NHS 
Trust confirms this assumption. Despite the fact that HRGs are calculated in order to 
ascertain costs of various treatments, the costing system (and, hence, HRGs) is only 
symbolically constructed. This figurative situation is frequently the case with unspecific and 
historical attempts to impose technical repairs by attempting to ‘control by numbers’ 
(Johnson & Kaplan, 1987; Ezzamel et al’s, 1990:164).  This Trust’s attempt to fulfil 
formally the demand of an external imposed law with no major influence and significance 
within its organisational interpretative schemes portrays a case of first-order change. This 
situation occurs when the changes are superficial and so they are accommodated by the 
organisation (see Laughlin, 1991 for more details). A case of second-order change implies 
alteration in the interpretative schemes and, consequently, on the systems and this might take 
long time to occur (see also Greenwood and Hinings, 1988, 1993 and Kitchener, M., 1998). 
However, continuous research to accompany the development of cost-control systems in the 
NHS is essential to provide further understanding about this issue. 
 
Secondly, the avoidance of this coupling discussed above is a result of the values embedded 
in the organisation’s interpretative schemes, which mirrors the lifeworld that informs the 
macro steering media. The disinterest in cost-control issues is traceable in the UK NHS 
culture, which reflects the notion that cost should not interfere in clinical work. Therefore, 
the values that inform the macro steering processes embrace the assumption that clinicians 
reject cost-control issues and this is the reason why the adoption of a less intrusive balanced 
budget performance indicator is preferred as a control device. Within this NHS Trust, 
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Finance Managers’ behaviour reflects a similar perception (that Clinicians reject cost as a 
control device) and, as a result, they protect Clinicians from engaging with cost-control 
matters. The implication is that the effect of this behaviour is a further disengagement 
between the parties within this NHS Trust.  
 
Thirdly, as it was expressed earlier, cost impinges on clinicians when they are pressurised by 
the management team to reduce expenses (when the ‘overspill’ problem occurs). On this 
occasion, clinicians embrace the perspective that they could manage cost-control issues 
rather better, especially if they had their budget directly ascribed to their own speciality.  
Nonetheless, although they claim that they have financial management skills, there is no 
evidence that they practice this vision within this NHS Trust. As the other organisational 
members, clinicians rather perform within the NHS culture, which discard cost as a control 
mechanism.   
 
A final aspect to mention is that the split between the administrative and the clinical worlds 
perceived within this NHS Trust confirms the findings addressed in previous literature (e.g. 
Kurunmaki, 2001; Llewellyn, 1998; Jacobs, 2001). However, while preceding studies argue 
that clinicians’ perception on accounting information originates from their professional 
culture, this study suggests that there is a possibility that the organisational situation override 
the professionals’ ethos of medics that rejects cost as a means of controlling resource in 
medicine. There is some evidence within this particular NHS Trust suggesting that clinicians 
are more aware of cost-control issues when they practice private medicine (clinicians 
practice both public and private medicine within the NHS Trust in consideration). There is 
an indication that medics have fractured value-sets that lead them to perceive cost/resource 
control in different ways in different contexts. This supposition raises a pertinent opportunity 
to further exploring the nature of such split in the interpretative schemes at an individual 
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level in order to build additional understanding of the nature of the lifeworld that informs the 
cost-control processes in the NHS as well as to provide further understanding of the future 
role for cost control in the NHS.  
 
Notes 
 
                                               
1
 Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs) ‘codify’ patients into categories of similar treatments and costs and 
classify 23 major diagnostic categories and 475 DRGs. DRGs served as basis for HRGs and, therefore, HRGs 
do not differ from DRG in essence.  
2
 Greenwood and Hidings’ theory implies that the organisational values (the interpretative schemes) inform the 
organisational steering mechanisms (the organisational design archetypes). 
3
 Broadbent and Laughlin’s (forthcoming) provide a more detail clarification of this theoretical combination.  
4
 The merger of the two hospitals created an issue that raised much local controversy. There is the perception 
amongst consultants that changes in Hospital 2 have generated some tension in the local community. Local 
patients feel neglected by the local hospital; since as a result of the changes, they have to travel further to 
receive treatment. 
5
 Bank staff is formed from the Trust’s employees, and agency staff are hired from agencies such as the BNA-
British Nurses Association. 
6
 This was stated by the Finance Team in this particular Trust as well as by a consultancy group hired by the 
Health Authority to look at clinical pressure within this Trust. 
7
 The Modernisation Fund (£276m) is the Government initiative launched to help HAs to support the NHS 
Trusts to tackle waiting-list achievement (HSC 1999/243).   
8
  During Jan/Feb 2001 – in this NHS Trust, 1133 inpatient operations took place, while 89 were cancelled. 
This position follows the cancellations’ national trend that has risen over the last quarter of that year (March, 
2001Board Meeting Report). 
9
 Procedure, specialty and disease omitted, in order to protect the identification of the Consultant.  
10
 This new glue replaced the traditional stitch, which, although it is cheaper, it demands more medical time. 
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